Every static analysis vendor will show you a detection chart. None of them will show you a false positive rate, and the false positive rate is the only number that decides whether the tool is still enabled in six months.
This page does not contain one either, and it is worth being direct about why. Publishing true positives, false positives and scan times for eight tools requires running all eight against a real codebase and triaging every single finding by hand, twice, by people who did not choose the tools. I have not done that, so there are no numbers here. A plausible-looking table with a disclaimer under it is worse than no table, because somebody will quote it in a procurement document and it will be wrong in a direction nobody can check.
What is publishable, and what almost nobody writes down, is the harness. The false positive rate of a SAST tool is not a property of the tool. It is a property of the interaction between the tool’s analysis engine, your language, your framework, your idioms and the age of your codebase. A tool that is excellent on a well-typed Go service can be unusable on a ten-year-old dynamically-wired PHP application. Any published number is measuring somebody else’s repository.
So what follows is the mechanism you need in order to interpret a scan at all, the architectural property that separates tools worth running from pattern matchers with a security label, the exact procedure for measuring these numbers on your own code, and the mistakes that make such a measurement meaningless. The results section is a specification for what to fill in, not a fabricated table.
Key takeaways
- SAST is taint analysis: tracing whether attacker-controlled data reaches a dangerous operation without passing through something that neutralises it. Everything else in the product is reporting around that core.
- Cross-file, cross-function dataflow is the dividing line. Single-file analysis cannot see the common shape of a real web application, where the source is in a controller and the sink is three layers down.
- False positive rate is the metric that decides adoption, nobody publishes it, and it is unpublishable in principle because it depends on your framework and your code, not on the tool.
- Framework modelling matters more than rule count. A tool that does not know your router marks a parameter as tainted will find nothing, no matter how many rules it ships.
How taint analysis actually works
Strip away the dashboards and a SAST engine does four things.
It parses your code into a tree. Not a regular expression over text, a real parse into an abstract syntax tree that understands that this identifier is a variable, that call is a method on this type, and this block is a loop body. That alone gets you syntactic rules: flag every call to a known-dangerous function, flag every hardcoded credential pattern, flag every disabled certificate check. Useful, shallow, and cheap.
It builds a control flow graph. Order of execution, branches, loops, exception paths. Now the engine can reason about what happens before what, and can tell that a check in one branch does not protect the other branch.
It builds a dataflow graph on top of that. For each value, where it came from and where it goes. Assignment, function argument, return value, field write, collection insert. This is where the analysis gets expensive, because following a value through a collection or through a field on an object that another function might also hold a reference to requires alias analysis, and alias analysis is where precision goes to die.
Then it runs taint propagation over that graph. Three definitions do all the work:
- A source is a point where untrusted data enters. A request parameter, a header, a cookie, a message off a queue, a row read back from a database that another tenant can write, a filename from an upload.
- A sink is an operation that is dangerous if it receives untrusted data. String-concatenated SQL, a shell invocation, a path join that reaches the filesystem, a template rendered without escaping, a deserialiser, a redirect target.
- A sanitiser is anything that makes tainted data safe for a specific sink. Parameterised query binding, shell argument escaping, path canonicalisation with a prefix check, HTML entity encoding.
A finding is a path from a source to a sink with no sanitiser on it. That is the whole idea, and the entire difficulty is in the words “path” and “sanitiser”.
Sanitisers are sink-specific, and this is the most common source of both false positives and false negatives. HTML-escaping a value makes it safe for a template and does nothing for a SQL query. If the engine’s model treats any escaping function as generic sanitisation, it will confidently clear paths that are still exploitable. If it does not recognise your in-house sanitiser at all, every path through it is a false positive, and you will get one per call site.
Every practical engine is deliberately unsound. A sound analysis reports every possible taint path including ones that cannot happen at runtime, and the output is unusable. So engines cut: they bound path depth, they stop following after a certain number of function hops, they refuse to model reflection, they give up on values that pass through dynamic dispatch they cannot resolve. Those cuts are what keep the tool fast and what produce false negatives. A vendor who tells you their engine has no false negatives is telling you it has enormous false positives, or is not telling you the truth.
Cross-file dataflow is the dividing line
Here is the shape of nearly every real vulnerability in a web application:
A route handler receives a request. It pulls a field out, maybe validates something unrelated, and passes it to a service object. The service does some business logic, puts the value on a struct, and hands the struct to a repository. The repository builds a query string. The dangerous concatenation is in the repository, four files and three call frames away from the source.
A single-file analyser sees the repository file in isolation. It sees a function that takes a string and concatenates it into SQL. It has two options, both bad. It can flag every such function, in which case it flags your entire data access layer and you turn it off. Or it can stay quiet unless the source is visible in the same file, in which case it finds nothing except the toy case where somebody wrote the query inline in the handler.
This is why the useful distinction in this category is not open source versus commercial, and not rule count. It is:
Syntactic pattern matching. AST-aware search. Find this shape of code. Excellent for policy enforcement, banned functions, missing configuration flags, insecure defaults, and for writing a rule in ten minutes when a real incident teaches you a pattern. Nearly free in scan time. Cannot find an injection that spans files, because it is not tracking values.
Intraprocedural dataflow. Taint tracking within one function. Catches the inline case. Still blind to the layered case.
Interprocedural, cross-file dataflow. Builds a whole-program call graph and follows taint across function and file boundaries. This is the class that finds real injections in real codebases, and it is the class that costs real scan time and real money.
Framework modelling is the hidden half of that third class. The engine does not magically know that a decorated function is an HTTP route, that the framework binds the request body to that struct by reflection, that this ORM method parameterises and that one does not, or that your template engine escapes by default except in the raw helper. Someone wrote those models by hand, per framework, per version. A tool with a deep engine and no model for your framework will report almost nothing, and the silence looks exactly like a clean codebase.
So the first question to ask a vendor is not how many rules they have. It is: which frameworks in my stack do you have source, sink and sanitiser models for, and what happens on the ones you do not. The second question is whether you can write your own models, because you will need to for your in-house sanitiser and your internal HTTP client.
Why false positive rate is the only metric that matters
Detection coverage has a floor set by physics and a ceiling set by nobody caring. Any of these tools will find the obvious injection in the handler. The thing that decides whether a tool is still in your pipeline next quarter is how much of your engineers’ attention it consumes per real bug.
The mechanism is simple and well known to anyone who has run a scanner. A pull request check that blocks on findings, where most findings are wrong, teaches every engineer on the team a single behaviour: find the fastest path to making it green. That path is a suppression comment. Once suppression becomes reflexive, the tool has negative value, because it is now generating the appearance of coverage while the real findings are being suppressed with the same keystroke as the false ones.
There are three buckets, not two, and the third is the one that does the damage.
- True positive, exploitable. The tool is right and somebody should fix it.
- False positive. The tool is wrong about what the code does. A sanitiser it did not recognise, a path that cannot execute, a type it mismodelled.
- True positive, irrelevant. The tool is right about the code and the finding does not matter. The source is an internal admin field only staff can set. The sink is a query against a read-only reporting replica. The path exists in a code branch behind a feature flag that has been off for two years.
That third bucket is usually larger than the second, it is never counted in anyone’s published numbers, and it is indistinguishable from a false positive from the perspective of the engineer who has to close it. Any measurement that lumps it into true positives will make a noisy tool look accurate.
And this is why the number is unpublishable in principle. Whether your sanitisers are recognised depends on whether you wrote them the conventional way. Whether the third bucket is large depends on how much of your attack surface is internal. Whether cross-file analysis resolves depends on whether your wiring is explicit or configuration-driven. Change any of those and the same tool produces a different number. A benchmark run on a deliberately vulnerable demo application measures the tool’s performance on a codebase written specifically to be scanned, which is the least representative corpus available.
The harness: measuring this on your own repository
This is reproducible, it takes about a week of one engineer’s time, and it produces a number that is actually about your situation. Do it before you sign anything.
Step one: freeze the corpus. Pick one repository that is representative of where your risk actually lives, and pin it to a commit SHA. Every tool scans that exact SHA. If you have several languages, do this once per language rather than averaging, because the averages are meaningless.
Step two: normalise the scope before you normalise anything else. Exclude vendored dependencies, generated code, test fixtures and build output, identically across every tool. This is the single largest source of bogus comparisons: one tool ignores node_modules by default and another does not, and you have just measured configuration, not analysis. Write the exclusion list once and translate it into each tool’s config.
Step three: normalise the ruleset scope. Tools ship very different defaults. One default profile includes maintainability and style rules, another is security-only, a third includes secret detection. Decide what you are comparing, which should almost always be security rules only, and configure each tool to that scope. Record exactly which rule packs are enabled, with versions.
Step four: normalise deduplication. Tools count differently. One reports a finding per sink. Another reports a finding per distinct source-to-sink path, so one bad query with four callers becomes four findings. Before comparing counts, collapse every tool’s output to a canonical key of file, line, and weakness class. SARIF output makes this scriptable. Comparing raw finding counts without this step is the most common way these comparisons go wrong.
Step five: build ground truth properly. Two engineers triage the full deduplicated finding set independently, without seeing each other’s verdicts and without knowing which tool produced which finding, which means stripping the tool name from the records first. Each finding gets one of the three labels above. Then reconcile disagreements in a joint session and record how many there were. That disagreement rate is your error bar, and if it is large your whole measurement is soft.
Step six: measure scan time honestly, and measure the right thing. Wall clock on a defined runner class, with rule packs and any vulnerability database already downloaded, repeated several times, reported as a median rather than a best case. Measure two separate figures, because they serve different decisions: full-repository scan time, which determines whether a nightly scan is viable, and incremental or changed-files scan time, which determines whether this can block a pull request. The second one is the number that decides whether developers accept the tool. A tool that takes an hour on the full repo and seconds on a diff is completely fine. A tool that takes minutes on every diff is not, no matter how good its engine is.
Step seven: measure recall with seeded bugs, in your own idioms. You cannot compute false negatives against your own repository, because you do not know its true bug set. So build a branch where you deliberately introduce known vulnerability patterns, written the way your team actually writes code, using your routers, your ORM, your template layer, your internal HTTP client. Include the layered case where the source and sink are several files apart, and the case where the value passes through a collection, and the case where it crosses a framework boundary. Count what each tool finds. This is the only recall measurement that means anything, because a public benchmark suite does not use your framework.
Step eight: measure the tuning delta, not just day one. Give each tool a defined tuning budget, say one working day. Write sanitiser models, suppress known-irrelevant classes, adjust severity. Re-run and re-triage. Most tools improve substantially and they do not improve equally, and how far a tool moves with a day of tuning is a better predictor of life with it than its out-of-the-box output. It also tells you how expressive its configuration actually is.
The mistakes that make this worthless, collected because each one has been made repeatedly:
- Counting findings instead of triaging them. More findings reads as better detection and is usually worse.
- Letting the person who championed a tool triage its output.
- Comparing default rulesets with different scopes.
- Timing a cold scan that includes downloading a rule pack or a vulnerability database.
- Scanning a language a tool supports only nominally and reporting the silence as a clean result rather than as no coverage.
- Using a deliberately vulnerable demo application as the corpus. It measures how well a tool finds bugs written to be found.
- Comparing a full scan on one tool against an incremental scan on another.
- Forgetting to pin versions, so a rule pack update mid-evaluation silently changes the results.
Needs first-hand data: Run the harness above and record, per tool and per language: total findings, findings after canonical deduplication, the three-way triage split, inter-rater disagreement rate, median full-scan wall clock, median incremental-scan wall clock, and seeded-bug recall. Publish the commit SHA, the rule pack versions and the runner specification alongside the numbers, or the numbers cannot be reproduced.
SARIF: an interchange format, not a product
Every serious tool in this category emits SARIF, and it is worth understanding what that does and does not buy you, because it is a standard rather than a feature anyone should be charging for.
SARIF is a JSON schema for static analysis results, standardised by a neutral body. It describes runs, the tool that produced them, rules with identifiers and descriptions, results with locations, and optionally the code flow, which is the ordered list of steps from source to sink.
What it gives you
One parsing path for every tool, so deduplication, routing and reporting scripts are written once rather than once per vendor. Native ingestion by code hosting platforms and vulnerability management systems, so findings appear as pull request annotations without bespoke integration. Code flow steps, which are what make a taint finding reviewable, since a reviewer needs the path and not just the endpoint. Stable rule identifiers, so you can track whether a finding class is growing or shrinking across scans. And a baseline concept, so a tool can mark results as new, unchanged or absent relative to a previous run, which is the mechanism behind reporting only what a pull request introduced.
What it does not do
It does not normalise severity. Each tool writes its own levels, and a high in one product is not a high in another. Cross-tool prioritisation is your own mapping.
It does not deduplicate. Two tools finding the same bug produce two unrelated results with different rule identifiers, and nothing in the format connects them. That reconciliation is exactly what vulnerability management platforms exist to do.
It does not guarantee useful content. A conformant file can contain a rule identifier, a file path and nothing else. Whether you get a code flow, a readable description or a suggested fix is up to the producer. SARIF support means a tool can write a file, and says nothing about the analysis behind it.
Semgrep

Semgrep’s core idea is that a security rule should look like the code it matches. You write a pattern in the target language with metavariables and ellipses, and the engine matches it against the syntax tree, so rules are readable by any engineer rather than only by whoever owns the scanner. The open engine does intraprocedural dataflow; cross-file taint tracking lives in the commercial Pro engine, which is the distinction that matters most when evaluating it.
Pros
- Rule authoring is genuinely accessible, so the team that hit an incident can encode the pattern the same week rather than filing a vendor request
- Fast enough on changed files to sit in a pull request check without becoming the slowest step
- Very broad language coverage for pattern rules, including configuration and infrastructure files
- Large community rule registry gives a usable starting point without writing anything
Cons
- The open source engine is single-function dataflow, so the layered source-to-sink case that dominates real applications needs the commercial engine
- A large registry ruleset enabled wholesale is extremely noisy, and the tuning work is real
- Pattern rules are precise about shape and blind to intent, so a refactor that changes structure silently stops matching
- Licence changes to parts of the open stack have made the long-term open story less predictable than it was
Best for: Teams who want security rules they can read, write and own, running in the pull request, with the option to pay for cross-file analysis when pattern rules stop being enough.
Pricing: The command line engine is free and open source. The hosted platform and the cross-file Pro engine are subscription, metered by contributing developers.
CodeQL
CodeQL treats your codebase as a database. An extractor compiles source into a relational representation of syntax, types, control flow and dataflow, which you query in a dedicated logic language. That inversion is the point: instead of rules pattern-matching a stream, you write queries joining across the whole program, which makes deep interprocedural taint tracking expressible rather than special-cased.
Pros
- Whole-program queries make cross-file, cross-function taint analysis a first-class capability rather than an add-on
- The query language is expressive enough to encode genuinely bespoke logic, including your own framework models
- Query packs are open and readable, so you can see exactly why a finding fired instead of trusting a black box
- Deep integration with the dominant code host means findings land as pull request annotations with no plumbing
Cons
- Compiled languages require a working build inside the extraction step, and getting a complex monorepo build to run in that context is a project of its own
- Database construction plus query evaluation is slow enough that full analysis is usually a scheduled job rather than a per-commit gate
- The query language is a real language with a real learning curve, so writing custom queries is not a task you hand to any engineer
- Practical use on private code is tied to one platform’s commercial add-on
Best for: Teams already on the dominant code host who want the deepest available dataflow analysis and have somebody willing to learn the query language.
Pricing: Free for public repositories and for open source use of the CLI. On private code it is licensed as part of the platform advanced security add-on, metered per active committer.
SonarQube

SonarQube arrived as a code quality platform and added security to it, which explains its shape. Its model is the quality gate: conditions evaluated against new code in a pull request, where new code must meet the bar while existing debt is tracked rather than blocking. Deeper taint analysis is reserved for commercial editions; the free self-hosted edition is primarily rule-based.
Pros
- The new-code quality gate is the single best pattern for adopting any analyser on a legacy codebase without a flag day
- One tool covering maintainability, reliability and security means engineers meet one gate instead of four
- Self-hosting is a genuine option, which matters where source code cannot leave your network
- Long history means stable, well-documented integrations with essentially every CI system
Cons
- Security taint analysis is a paid-edition capability, so the free edition is much closer to a linter than to a SAST tool
- Security findings sit alongside thousands of maintainability findings, and the security signal gets diluted in the queue
- Self-hosted operation means a database, an upgrade path and a server to keep alive
- Commercial editions are metered by lines of code, which is a poor proxy for value in a large monorepo
Best for: Teams who want one gate covering quality and security, particularly where a self-hosted deployment is a requirement.
Pricing: Free self-hosted community edition. Commercial editions and the hosted service are priced by volume of code analysed, with edition tiers gating taint analysis and enterprise features.
Snyk Code
Snyk Code is the static analysis component of a broader platform covering dependencies, containers and infrastructure code too. Its design priority is latency: results fast enough to run in the editor as you write, not only in CI. That speed plus the shared platform is why teams pick it, because one policy model across four scanner types is worth real money in coordination cost.
Pros
- Fast enough for in-editor feedback, which moves findings to the cheapest possible moment to fix them
- Shares a platform with dependency, container and infrastructure scanning, so there is one findings surface and one policy model
- Fix suggestions are concrete code changes rather than rule descriptions, which shortens the distance from finding to pull request
- Setup is genuinely quick, with no build step required for most languages
Cons
- The analysis is proprietary, so you cannot inspect why a finding fired or fully reproduce it outside the product
- Custom rule authoring is far more limited than in the query-based or pattern-based alternatives
- Depth varies noticeably between supported languages and the difference is not advertised
- Platform pricing scales with developers, which gets expensive quickly across a large engineering organisation
Best for: Teams who want one commercial platform across code, dependencies and containers, with developer-facing results in the editor rather than a security team report.
Pricing: Free tier with a monthly test allowance, then per-developer subscription tiers, with enterprise agreements above that. Alternatives are compared in Snyk alternatives.
Checkmarx

Checkmarx is the enterprise incumbent and behaves like one. Very broad language and framework coverage, deep configurability of queries and presets, and a management layer built around application ownership, policy and reporting to people who are not engineers. It earns its place in an estate with many languages and applications and a security function that must report across all of them.
Pros
- Language and framework coverage is among the broadest available, which matters in a heterogeneous estate
- Queries and presets are customisable in depth, so in-house sanitisers and internal frameworks can be modelled properly
- Application and policy management is built for an organisation with dozens of applications and formal ownership
- Available self-hosted, which keeps source code inside your perimeter
Cons
- Full scans are slow enough that per-pull-request gating usually requires an incremental mode with its own caveats
- Out-of-the-box output volume is high, and getting to a signal engineers trust is a tuning project, not a setting
- Deployment and administration require dedicated ownership rather than being a side task
- Enterprise sales motion with annual contracts and no meaningful self-serve path
Best for: Large organisations with many languages, formal application ownership and a security team that must report across the whole estate.
Pricing: Annual enterprise contracts, typically metered by developers or by applications under scan, quoted rather than listed.
Veracode

Veracode’s distinguishing choice is that its primary analysis runs against compiled bytecode and binaries rather than source. That removes a class of problem: you analyse what actually ships, including paths introduced by the compiler and by dependencies you did not build. It also makes the unit of work an uploaded artefact, which shapes the workflow toward release gates and formal attestation rather than inline feedback.
Pros
- Analysing built artefacts means what you scan is what you ship, including third-party components compiled in
- No source code needs to leave your repository, which occasionally resolves a contractual objection
- Policy-based pass and fail with formal reporting is well suited to producing evidence for customers and auditors
- Long-established remediation guidance and consulting support around the findings, which matters for teams without in-house appsec
Cons
- Requires a correctly packaged build artefact, and packaging mistakes silently reduce coverage rather than failing loudly
- The upload-and-wait model puts it at release gates, far from the moment the code was written
- Turnaround is slow relative to source-based scanners, which makes it a poor fit for per-commit feedback
- Customisation of the analysis itself is limited compared with query-based or pattern-based tools
Best for: Regulated or enterprise teams who need release-gate scanning of shipped artefacts and formal attestation output more than they need in-editor feedback.
Pricing: Annual subscription, metered by application count or scan volume, with bundles across the vendor’s other testing products.
Bearer
Bearer approaches the problem from the data side. Instead of asking whether tainted input reaches a dangerous sink, it asks which sensitive data types exist in your code and where they flow: does personal data reach a log statement, a third-party API, an analytics client, an unencrypted store. That reframing answers questions conventional SAST handles badly, particularly privacy review and data mapping.
Pros
- Classifies sensitive data types and traces where they flow, which answers privacy questions no conventional SAST rule addresses
- Produces the kind of data flow inventory that data protection assessments actually ask for, from code rather than from a questionnaire
- Open source core means you can run it in CI with no procurement step and inspect the rules
- Complements rather than duplicates a conventional scanner, so it adds a different class of finding rather than more of the same
Cons
- Narrower conventional vulnerability coverage, so it is an addition to a SAST tool rather than a replacement for one
- Data classification produces its own false positives, since a field named for a person is not always personal data
- Smaller ecosystem and community than the established scanners, with correspondingly less material when you get stuck
- Language and framework coverage is narrower than the broad commercial products
Best for: Teams with real privacy obligations who need to know where personal data flows in code, alongside a conventional scanner rather than instead of one.
Pricing: Open source CLI free to run with no vendor bill. A commercial cloud offering adds management, policy and reporting, priced per developer.
Opengrep
Opengrep is a community fork of the open source pattern-matching engine, created by a group of security vendors after licence changes upstream. Its reason to exist is governance rather than technology: the same rule syntax and broadly the same engine, maintained by a consortium committed to a permissive licence, so tools embedding it are not exposed to one vendor’s future licensing decisions.
Pros
- Permissive licensing with multi-vendor governance, which is the point for anyone embedding an engine in their own product
- Rule syntax compatibility means existing pattern rules and registries transfer without rewriting
- No commercial tier gating core functionality, so what you run is what there is
- Multiple maintainers with an interest in the project surviving reduces single-vendor risk
Cons
- A fork inherits the upstream engine’s limits, which means pattern matching and single-function dataflow, not cross-file taint analysis
- Younger project, so ecosystem maturity, documentation and tooling lag the upstream
- Divergence from upstream over time will erode rule compatibility, and how fast is unknown
- No commercial platform around it, so triage, tracking and reporting are entirely your build
Best for: Teams and tool vendors who need a permissively licensed pattern-matching engine with governance that does not depend on one company.
Pricing: Free and open source with no vendor and no bill. The cost is the CI time it consumes and the triage workflow you build around it.
How to choose
Answer these in order. The first two eliminate most of the market.
One. Does your risk live in layered code? If your application follows the controller, service, repository shape, single-file analysis will not find your real injections and you need cross-file dataflow. If your codebase is mostly thin handlers and configuration, pattern matching genuinely covers a lot of it and you can save the money.
Two. Are your frameworks modelled? Ask each vendor, specifically, for the list of source, sink and sanitiser models covering your web framework, your ORM and your template layer, and what happens on the ones not covered. Then verify with the seeded-bug branch from the harness, because the answer you get in a sales call and the answer your code gives you are not always the same.
Three. Where does it need to run? Pull request gating needs incremental scan time measured in seconds to low minutes. Scheduled full analysis can take an hour. Most teams need both, and the tools that are good at each are not always the same tool. Running a fast pattern matcher in the pull request and a deep analyser nightly is a legitimate and common architecture, and cheaper than forcing one tool to do both.
Four. Can you write your own rules and models? You will need to, for your in-house sanitiser and your internal HTTP client at minimum. Tools where that is a support ticket rather than a file in your repository will stay mismatched to your code forever.
Five. Can source code leave your network? This is a compliance answer, not a preference, and it removes candidates faster than anything else on this list.
| Tool | Analysis class | Deployment | Picks itself when |
|---|---|---|---|
| Semgrep | Pattern matching, dataflow in Pro | Cloud or self-managed CLI | You want readable rules you own |
| CodeQL | Whole-program query, deep dataflow | Platform-integrated | You need the deepest analysis available |
| SonarQube | Rules, taint in paid editions | Self-hosted or cloud | One gate for quality and security |
| Snyk Code | Proprietary, latency-optimised | Cloud | One platform across code and dependencies |
| Checkmarx | Deep dataflow, highly configurable | Self-hosted or cloud | Many languages, many applications |
| Veracode | Bytecode and binary analysis | Cloud, artefact upload | Release gates and formal attestation |
| Bearer | Sensitive data flow | Self-managed CLI or cloud | Privacy and data mapping questions |
| Opengrep | Pattern matching | Self-managed CLI | You need permissive licensing and governance |
| SARIF (standard, not a product) | Result interchange | Not applicable | You are normalising output from several tools |
Needs first-hand data: Before and after a defined one-day tuning budget on each shortlisted tool, record the count of findings engineers suppressed rather than fixed. The suppression rate after tuning, not the finding count before it, is what predicts whether the tool will still be enabled next year.
Needs first-hand data: Instrument your pull request pipeline to record the added wall clock the security check contributes, at the median and at the ninety-ninth percentile across a month of real pull requests. Developers do not reject tools for their average cost; they reject them for the tail.
Frequently asked questions
What is the difference between SAST and SCA?
They analyse different code and find different classes of problem. SAST analyses source your team wrote and can find a flaw that has never been reported anywhere, because it exists only in your application. SCA analyses the third-party packages you installed and matches them against published advisories. A SAST tool will not tell you that a library you depend on has a known vulnerability, and an SCA tool will not tell you that your own handler concatenates a request parameter into a query. You need both, and the dependency side is covered in dependency scanning and SCA tools.
Should SAST block a pull request?
Yes, but only on a narrow, high-confidence ruleset and only on newly introduced code. Blocking on the full ruleset against the whole repository on day one is how teams end up with a blanket suppression convention within a month. The pattern that works is a small set of rules you are confident about as a hard gate, everything else reported as an informational comment, and the whole repository scanned on a schedule with findings routed into normal work rather than into the merge path. Set the baseline so existing debt does not block new work, then let the new-code gate stop the pile growing.
Can AI replace static analysis?
Language models are genuinely useful at explanation and suggestion: describing why a flagged path is dangerous, drafting a fix, writing the framework model you need. They are weaker at the part that matters, deciding with confidence whether a specific path exists in a program, because that is a structural question with a correct answer and a model produces a plausible answer instead. The practical shape today is a deterministic engine that establishes the path plus a model that explains it and proposes the fix.
Why does the same tool find far more in one repository than another?
Almost always framework modelling rather than code quality. If the engine has models for one repository’s framework and not the other’s, the first produces findings and the second produces silence, and silence looks identical to a clean codebase. Before concluding that a service is well written, run the seeded-bug branch against it.
Is a free SAST tool good enough?
For pattern rules, banned functions, insecure defaults and configuration checks, yes, and that is a meaningful fraction of the value. For cross-file taint analysis on a layered application, the free options are mostly limited to single-function dataflow, and that limit is structural rather than a licensing nag. A free pattern matcher in the pull request plus disciplined dependency and secret scanning covers more real risk for a small team than a deep analyser nobody has time to tune. The sequencing is in security tools for small engineering teams.
Related reading
- Best application security tools — the hub, and where SAST sits relative to everything else.
- Best dependency scanning and SCA tools — the other half of code scanning, and why reachability decides the noise level.
- Best DAST tools — finding what static analysis structurally cannot see.
- Best secret scanning tools — the highest-signal scanner in this whole category.
- Snyk alternatives — if the platform bundle is the thing you are actually re-evaluating.
- Best vulnerability management platforms — reconciling findings once more than one tool is reporting.